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Why Global Law is Transnational
Remarks on the Symposium around William
Twining’s Montesquieu Lecture
§

Peer Zumbansen*

I

Professor William Twining loves puzzles. And he is fine that his energy is spent
on puzzles of which he will probably never have all the pieces. The point seems
to be the act of puzzling itself, the identification of pieces and the appreciation
of their shape in an attempt to understand their place in the bigger picture. In
that vein, he observes the subjects of his scholarship not only through books but
through his own perception, involvement and experience. His scholarly work and
academic teaching have taken him practically everywhere, engaging with the
world, and with concepts and conundra, with a particular sense of modesty,

§

This short text serves as the introduction to Transnational Legal Theory’s Symposium on William Twining’s
Montesquieu Lecture, ‘Globalisation and Legal Scholarship’ (Tilburg Law Lecture Series, Montesquieu Seminars,
vol 4 (2009). Following a globally disseminated call for papers, scholars—both established and emerging—submitted
essays and comments on Professor Twining’s published lecture. Professor Twining generously agreed to offer
individual feedback and comments on all published Symposium contributions, and to write a general response essay,
which concludes this issue. I had the pleasure of working closely with graduate students and faculty at Osgoode Hall
Law School, York University (Toronto) and at Harvard Law School on their contributions to the Symposium, and I
want to say a special thanks to Professor Willem Witteveen from Tilburg Law School in The Netherlands for making
copies of Professor Twining’s lecture in book form available to all contributors. Finally, I want to thank Priya
Gupta and Hengameh Saberi for valuable feedback, and Ruth Massey at Hart Publishing for her immeasurable help
in getting this issue ready for publication. Websites accessed March 2014.
*
Professor of Law & Canada Research Chair, Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto, Canada. Spring
2014, Visiting Professor, Yale Law School. Email: Pzumbansen@osgoode.yorku.ca.

humility and irony. For example, in his Herbert Bernstein Memorial Lecture,
delivered in 2009 at Duke Law School, Professor Twining presented himself as
the founder—and, so far, as the only member—of a ‘new school of
jurisprudence’
, namely ‘the self-critical legal studies movement’
. He also
acknowledged that—like all academic lawyers today—he found himself to be
a‘comparatist not by specialization, but by situation’
.1 There are two, at least two,
references in here: one is to Roberto Unger’s article in the Harvard Law Review
on ‘The Critical Legal Studies Movement’
, which was later published in book
form,2 and another is to Karl Llewellyn’s notion of the ‘situation sense’
.3 This
recent reference to academic lawyers being comparatists ‘by situation’
, however,
appears to identify the context in which these lawyers are arguably operating
today. For Professor Twining, these situations are, for better or worse, described
as or associated with ‘so-called “globalisation”’
. The defining nature of these
situations, for him, is that they are ones of pluralism—a wide field of study, both
in theory and practice, in law and non-law, areas and demarcations to which
Professor Twining has devoted an enormous amount of time and attention.4
Against this background he notes, in his 2009 seminal monograph General
Jurisprudence: Understanding Law from a Global Perspective:

‘If one is

interested in the relations between municipal law and other normative orders
there are conceptual problems however one defines or conceptualises law. The
definitional stop is only one of several problems in this area, most of which are
unlikely to be resolved by conceptual analysis or formal definitions alone.’5 In
the text that informs the present Symposium before us today, he writes: ‘The
problem of the “definitional stop”— where to draw the line between legal and

non-legal, if one adopts a broad conception of law—has re-surfaced in the
context of debates about legal pluralism. This is not a specific puzzle about
legal pluralism as such, but is part of the perennial topic of how best to
conceptualise law.’6
In his Bernstein Lecture, he gave an elaborate account of the different,
divergent and competing conceptions as well as realities of pluralism, never
losing sight of the fact that ‘when lawyers hear about legal pluralism many are
puzzled, even resistant to the idea’
.7 For Professor Twining, the discussion of
pluralism—on the one hand, as a social fact that concerns actually existing
normative orders that bind human behaviour and, on the other, as a challenge to
legal theory and, as such, to the very understanding and definition of what
should properly be called law and what shouldn’t—must be at the centre of
our engagements with the consequences of globalisation for law. He notes how
‘[i]t is fairly obvious that the main puzzles are to do with the what counts as
“legal” (rather than what is plural) and that nearly all writing about legal
pluralism adopts or presupposes a broad conception of law that extends the
“Westphalian Duo” of the municipal or domestic law of sovereign states and
public international law conceived as dealing

with relations between such

states’8 before observing, a little later, that ‘[p]uzzles about the concept of
law, positivism, and other general issues in normative and legal theory are an
unavoidable part of the backdrop of the study of legal pluralism. The topic
becomes significant when one adopts a broad conception of law and treats
concepts such as institutionalized normative orders or systems or sets of rules
as meaningful. From that perspective legal pluralism is a normal and near-

universal phenomenon.’9 Professor Twining’s engagement with pluralism must
be seen as part of a larger picture in which we find laid out some of the most
pressing challenges for social, economic and political order today—as seen
through the lens of law. It is here that he displays one of his strongest and most
admirable

characteristics—an

impressive

and

inspiring

combination

of

intellectual curiosity with a seemingly inexhaustible energy to approach and to
engage with what others have thought, written and said and to listen to them.
What we find here, and what is so equally forcefully illustrated by his
comprehensive response to the contributors to our Symposium, is the generosity
with which he engages with the work, the ideas, even the flaws, of others. It is
also this generosity through which others are being placed at the centre of
attention, in order to be pulled into a conversation the goal of which never
appears to be the establishment of who is ‘wrong’ or who is ‘right’
, but—
throughout—the pursuit of something grander. At the same time, the Montesquieu
Lecture, which forms the starting point of this Symposium, is clearly addressed
to legal scholars of all convictions, whether or not they understand themselves
as doctrinalists or theorists, as globalisation scholars or teachers of domestic
law. One of the lecture’s best achievements is to present the challenges of
globalisation processes for law in an accessible and informative, yet never oversimplifying manner. While it provides us with an eye-opening introduction to
many of the currently found contentions among lawyers and social theorists
investigating the impact of globalisation and transnationalisation processes, it
contains numerous references to further reading and thought, inviting us to
enter into the debate.

The success of such a presentation depends, crucially, on the ability of a
scholar to consciously move back and forth between his (or her) own
assumptions and starting points and those of others. So, it is neither surprising
nor presumptuous when Professor

Twining, as mentioned earlier, holds

himself out as the founder (and only member) of the self-critical legal
studies movement. Twining’s impressive scholarship reflects his curiosity for
the many complex forms of social orders and the place and role of law
within those. It furthermore reveals him as a scholar who engages with the
work of others with generosity, openness, thoughtfulness and care.

II

In Professor Twining’s work the challenge of pluralism occupies a central place
in the rich and sophisticated scholarly landscape of which he is a most avid
and diligent gardener—and architect. This deserves particular emphasis and
recognition, as it helps to contextualise the Montesquieu Lecture which he
gave in 2009 at Tilburg Law School. This context itself, however, we might
say, is the central topic and preoccupation of his lecture. The title of the lecture
becomes the key to unlocking the context. By choosing the

theme of

‘globalisation and legal scholarship’
, Professor Twining engages not only with
the ways in which lawyers have been seeking to adequately identify and respond
to the challenges of a globalising world, but, in addition, how this theoretical
work may translate back into legal education and curriculum reform. Both

globalisation and scholarship deserve our attention today and have done so, as
Professor Twining notes regarding the former, for at least 30 years. Throughout
that period, scholars—in law as well as in other disciplines—have been
engaging with the definition, analysis and even affirmation or rejection of their
object of study. ‘Globalisation’ has brought about a particular breed of scholar,
teacher, academic—all of whom find themselves engaged in so-called
‘globalisation studies’
. Professor Twining never just ‘buys’ a thing (idea,
concept, claim), but turns it over, squeezes it and holds it against the light from
different angles in order to both gain distance from it and create the possibility
of seeing it through someone else’s eyes, against different backgrounds,
assumptions, beliefs and traditions.10 He astutely identifies globalisation as not
being a simple given, but a historical (socio-economic, political, cultural)
condition as well as a framework of analysis. This is a crucial move because it
allows us to see the inevitability of its impact on the ‘other’ side of the equation,
namely legal scholarship. If globalisation challenges different disciplinary
frameworks in a fundamental way, and if one of the consequences of this
challenge and of the various forms in which scholars (but also activists,11
amongst others12) have responded to it, is the

approximation and

interpenetration of different disciplinary approaches, then it will be
unavoidable to ask to what degree lawyers and legal scholars must begin to
think in an interdisciplinary fashion.13
But, how should this be done? It appears as if the centrality of (normative
and legal) pluralism in our current efforts to study the globalisation challenges
for law presents a strong argument in favour of a multiand interdisciplinary

approach. Whether it is the analysis of the function and operation of non-state
norms in domestic and religious as well as associational settings14 or of
transnational regimes of global regulatory

governance,15 it has become

increasingly obvious that a legal analysis needs to draw on insights from
sociologists, anthropologists, economic and social geographers, to name just a
few. This is the other side of the pair in the title ‘globalisation and legal
scholarship’
, which depicts the topic of Professor Twining’s lecture. His is a
forceful reminder of how deeply embedded legal analysis is in a much bigger
scholarly enterprise to make sense of this world. His own scholarship over the
years attests to his acknowledgement of a need to constantly call into question
and, eventually, to revise, adapt or scrap one’s starting assumptions. For a
largely state-based legal theory, the transnationalisation of regulatory regimes,
whatever label we choose to apply from public to private, national or
international to transnational, poses enormous challenges.16 But, from the
perspective of a legal theory that is opening itself up for an interdisciplinary
investigation into the nature of emerging global orders, the messy, pluralist
regimes present an important opportunity. The ‘spatialisation’ of regulatory
frameworks on the transnational scale prompts (or should prompt17) a
conceptual and theoretical engagement that ‘naturally’ breaks down and
redraws disciplinary boundaries,18 meanwhile harking back to earlier work in
legal pluralism in an attempt to continue to interrogate the relationship
between differently conceived spheres of social ordering.19 As Professor
Twining repeatedly emphasises, the

line-drawing in the context of legal

pluralism is not one of empirical observation but of qualification, which

ultimately makes it a matter of choice.20 With the recognition of a norm as
‘law’ comes the challenge of justifying this recognition. At that point, it is no
longer possible to let all flowers bloom; one must call a rose by her name.21

III

More or less just before the half-way point of his lecture, Professor Twining
provides his readers with a most telling overview of the themes that he has
‘identified inductively in over ten years of thinking about globalisation and
law and general jurisprudence’
.22 These are the following:

•

the whole Western tradition of academic law is based on several kinds of
assumptions that need to be critically examined in a changing context;

•

we lack concepts and data to generalise about legal phenomena in the world as a
whole: analytic concepts that can transcend, at least to some extent, different
legal traditions and cultures;

•

comparison is the first step to generalisation and more sophisticated and
expansive approaches to comparative law are critical for the development of
a healthy discipline of law;

•

we need more sophisticated normative theories that are well-informed and
sensitive to pluralism of beliefs and differences between value systems; and,
especially, we need improved empirical understandings of how legal doctrines,
institutions and practices operate in ‘the real world’
.23

It would be difficult to dismiss any of the above five points on the basis that
they are irrelevant or trivial. Rather, each and every theme identified by
Professor Twining captures a wider range of concerns which refer back to
law’s (longstanding) identity and construction problems. What makes the
lecture such a rich source of insights as well as an invitation to further
investigation is his diligent and thought provoking engagement with the
identified themes in the continuation of the presentation.
The contributions to the following Symposium engage, each in their own
way, with one or more of these contentions. In the context of this brief
introduction, my aim has been to contextualise his project and to draw out
these themes a little more, with the goal of underlining their explanatory
quality and merit. As concerns the first theme, we have here an illustration of
Twining’s ‘self-critical’ approach in that he echoes and hints at what others
have formulated as a claim to ‘provincialize Europe’24 in order to open up the
space of recognising other histories, trajectories and patterns of social, political
and cultural order. Given the centrality of the state and its legacy in both
defining and embedding law within the Western legal imagination,25 it is with
particular urgency and justification that authors have been raising claims to decentre, shift or otherwise ‘provincialise’ these assumptions today.26 Arguably,
comparative law has become one of the central battlegrounds—or, perhaps,
construction sites, however you wish to approach the issue—for a serious
reconsideration of state-centrism on the one hand and of the quality of nonstate law as a historical element of any state legal order on the other.
Regardless of where one’s legal scholarship is primarily focused, it appears

that it has

become increasingly difficult to either disregard or avoid

comparative perspectives.

[T]oday no scholar, or even student, of law can focus solely on the domestic law of
a single jurisdiction … We are in an important sense all comparatists now, even
if most of us lack sophistication in comparative method. Comparative law is
increasingly more like a way of life than a marginal subject for a few specialists.
The processes of transnationalisation significantly increase this trend.27

This claim, however, raises a host of questions as to the methodology of
practising,28 adjudicating,29 even teaching30 the emerging legal pluralism of
comparative transnational31 law. Professor Twining alerts us to the risk of
separating the obvious contenders for transnational or global law such as
public international law or the law of international trade and finance from the
otherwise ‘domestic’
, ‘less obvious’ subjects (‘contracts, criminal law, family
law, intellectual property, and labour law’). Regarding the latter, he observes
a ‘growing emphasis on the transnational dimensions’ of these areas of
instruction and practice. This is, indeed, an important point to be made in
the context of world-wide efforts to ‘internationalise’ or ‘globalise’ legal
education, which often still have their primary focus on the introduction of
mandatory international law elements in the curriculum,32 the development of
experiential learning opportunities with a global dimension,33 or the boosting
of the school’s offering in international student exchanges.34 Meanwhile,
efforts

are

underway—with

varying

success—to

include

comparative/transnational

law

elements

in

the

first-year

law

school

curriculum.35 In my view, first-year law courses are the decisive laboratories for
a radical transformation of legal education with a commitment to transnational
legal thought. Rather than offering specialised seminars to those few students
already interested in ‘international law’
, the key will be to illustrate the
transnationalisation of law at the heart of what is usually considered as law
with a merely domestic scope. Such an enterprise requires substantive efforts on
the part of professors and law schools. The former would have to sit down to
review their course programs in a given area (say contracts, torts, property,
constitutional) and identify cases or case studies with a transnational dimension.
Such examples

could receive a slightly expanded treatment in class,

introducing students to a way of reading a case or approaching a legal
regulatory challenge ‘in context’ and ‘in action’
. Building on groundbreaking
work in that regard,36 the present task consists in illustrating to students as
future members of a transnational profession the radically expanding and
evolving context of their work and of the cases they will be working on.37
The next theme Professor Twining mentions concerns the unavailability of
‘concepts and data to generalise about legal phenomena as a whole’
. While that
is true in a sense, it is also a considerable understatement, as Professor Twining
is one who approaches and engages with the longstanding and emerging
developments that bring lawyers in closer dialogue with political philosophers38
and the ‘global justice’ thinkers building on that work,39 as well as with
sociologists and legal pluralists who have been studying the world from a postnational perspective with enormous curiosity and respect.40 So, while it is true

not only that there are no one-size-fits-all concepts to make sense of
globalisation but also that there cannot be such concepts, the task—as argued
by Professor Twining in his Montesquieu Lecture, as well as in his 2000
monograph Globalisation and Legal Theory41 and his 2009 magnum opus
General Jurisprudence42—is one of a dedicated, interdisciplinary engagement
in a methodological project. Laying down the epistemological foundations and
defining the directions of this undertaking—in light of the fact that we are
dealing with ‘complex and bewildering processes’43 —are challenging tasks, as
echoed by just about every contribution to this Symposium. Emerging from this
engagement, however, is the impression that the reward is in the doing itself.
The subsequent two themes—a critical engagement with and further expansion
of comparative legal studies and the elaboration of ‘more sophisticated normative
theories’—are in many ways connected to each other. Comparative law, since
its inauguration at the World Congress in Paris in 1900, has seen a no less
than

breathtaking

(if

exasperating!44)

process

of

experimentation

and

consolidation, interdisciplinary transformation, and apparently unending moments
of self-doubt.45 Meanwhile, many of these woes seem to be directly related to
the anxieties that accompany the erosion of belief systems and of models
formerly held to be of a more stable and reliable nature.46 To me, crucial in this
regard is Professor Twining’s insistence on the notion of ‘interdependence’
, on
recognising the challenge of normative and legal pluralism as existing in both
spheres of the Global South and the Global North,47 and—importantly—as
being a phenomenon which confronts us on the ‘sub-global’ level.

A high proportion of processes loosely referred to as ‘global’ operate at more
limited subglobal levels. These levels, insofar as they are spatial, are not nested
in a single vertical hierarchy—galactic, global, regional, national, sub-state, local
and so on. Interdependence is largely a function of proximity or closeness:
proximity can be spatial (geographical contiguity), colonial, military, linguistic,
religious, historical, or legal. In other words, a picture of patterns of law in the
world needs to take account of regions, empires, diasporas, alliances, trading
partners, pandemics, legal traditions and families. The British Empire, the
Englishspeaking world, religious and ethnic diasporas, the common law world, ‘the
Arab world’
, even so-called ‘World Wars’ are all sub-global; so it is misleading to
talk about them as if they apply to the world as a whole.48

Sociologists, geographers and lawyers who are embracing a spatial conception
of social order have pointed to the need to interrogate the legally fixed
boundaries of competence, power and authority (jurisdiction) in order to pick
up the actual dynamics of human (as well as institutional) interaction and the
evolution of post-jurisdictional regimes in an effort to better understand and
appreciate the artificial nature of boundaries that are drawn by legal rights.49
As Professor Eve Darian-Smith, one of the contributors to this Symposium,
has argued elsewhere: ‘In an attempt to transcend the artificiality of a
global/local divide and the opening up of legal spaces previously unrecognized,
new

legal ethnographies suggest that the impact and production of

globalization—however

defined—occur within and without the formal

boundaries of nation-states. Moreover, these studies indicate that in any

examination of law and its relationship to globalization, analysis must take
into account a range of theoretical perspectives and subject positions.’50
The reciprocal deconstruction between a state-oriented comparatist agenda
and a post-grand narratives51 search for normative theory/ies has significant
echoes in the current troubles of adapting legal doctrine, theory and
methodology to the ‘complex and bewildering processes’ of globalisation,
processes—to be sure—that are grounded in a global social context and, by
consequence, implicate stark degrees of winning and losing.52 In particular we
are here concerned with the relationship between doctrinal claim making and
empirical fact assessment, which informs the fifth and last theme in Professor
Twining’s enumeration. In short, this theme is a rallying call to reinvigorate a
type of socio-legal studies that was once at the forefront of legal theory and legal
education reform, with a dedicated commitment to interdisciplinarity,
empirical assessment and field work in an effort to study the actual processes
of norm implementation and (the trials and tribulations of) legal change.53 It is
here that an entire—and yet not entirely new—world seems to be opening up.
The much discussed, more recent ‘empirical turn’ in law and international
relations54 has its roots in a rich context of longer-coming approximations
between law and social but also ‘hard’ sciences,55 specifically in the selfcritical
assessment of law’s volatile knowledge basis.56 The promise lies in the embrace
of this project on several methodological levels. The dynamic relations and, in
fact, tensions between normative and legal pluralism at both supraand sub-state
levels require a re-invigoration of legal theory as a historically informed,

interdisciplinary engagement with law in a transnational context. Furthermore,
the challenge consists in developing an approach that ties law’s present
engagements with so-called globalisation processes back to the epistemological
and structural challenges that law and legal decision-making have been facing
all along. At the same time, it will be crucial to both draw on and yet relativise
and update previous efforts of thinking, teaching and practising law as ‘law in
context’
. In other words, the transnationalisation of law unfolds against the
background of decolonisation and in the midst of a wide ranging contestation of
claims regarding an

emerging ‘new world order’
. By consequence, this

constellation is, on the one hand, marked by the institutional disaggregation of
nation-states and a crisis of nation-state-based models of legal-political power,57
but at the same time we can witness a growing awareness of the need to
radically de-centre and provincialise the Western legal imagination58 on the other.
Against that background, a simple resort to a ‘social sciences’ approach to law
and legal studies seems too weak. What today’s dynamic and empirically rich
work on law, globalisation and post-colonialism shows is that a reinvigoration of,
say, ‘law and society’ as a counterpoint to universalisation or ‘end of history’
accounts can only be successful if it challenges the mainstream not only on
argumentative, ideological grounds

but also through detailed ethnographic

evidence that shows the inaccuracy and fallacy of abstract models regarding
‘growth’
, ‘modernisation’ or ‘democratisation’
. At this point, we may have to
recognise the potential for a renewal of sociological jurisprudence59 by shortcircuiting and approximating socio-legal studies under the umbrella of
sociology of law, ‘law & society’ and so-called ‘new legal realism’
.60 Given the

enormous normative stakes of a legal-sociological analysis of transnational
regulatory regimes, it is important to situate this legal theory project within
the interdisciplinary global governance discourse, which is fuelled and driven by
contributions

from

political

scientists,

sociologists,

geographers

and

anthropologists. In this way, we would bring a renewed sociological
jurisprudence closer to the vibrant research projects that are currently
underway and which scrutinise the nature of global and transnational legal
pluralism and the role of law in global governance overall and under specialised
circumstances. Such an approach would seek to work out the contours and
parameters of a concept of transnational legal pluralism which builds on
earlier domestic and local forms of legal pluralism in the hope of adequately
capturing and depicting the tensions between competing models of social ordering
and problematising them in relation to evolving understandings of legal
doctrine and legal theory.61 The methodological challenges of such an
undertaking notwithstanding, it seems clear that questions of law’s selection of
and interaction with ‘alternative knowledges’62 will define its—and our—
ability to carve out a place for ‘thinking like a lawyer’ in these challenging times
and circumstances. Professor Twining’s scholarship on law and globalisation
marks an important contribution to this effort.
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